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Abstract
The present paper is concerned with the preconditions for ministerial 
government in Iceland and the role of  parliament in sustaining it. Ministerial 
government is a form of  coalition governance where the division of  portfolios 
between parties functions as the basic mechanism of  managing coalitions. 
Ministers are policy dictators in the sense that they control their ministries 
without interference from their coalition partners. Ministerial government is 
considered a weak form of  coalition governance in the literature on account of  
its susceptibility to principal-agent problems, i.e., the temptation of  ministers 
to adopt policies which are beneficial to their own party, or themselves, even if  
they are harmful to the coalition as a whole. 
We argue that ministerial government was the guiding principle of  coalition 
governance in Iceland prior to the crash of  2008. We demonstrate that 
given a number of  conditions, ministerial government can in fact function 
effectively in the sense of  providing the necessary minimum of  inter-coalition 
checks. Instead of  the cabinet providing oversight, however, the parties and 
committees in parliament play a key role in controlling policy drift. For a 
number of  reasons, the financial crash in Iceland undermined some of  the 
features on which ministerial government rested and coalition co-ordination 
after the crash has diverged significantly from the preceding period. It is too 
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early, however, to tell whether these represent a permanent shift in coalition 
management in Iceland.
Keywords: Ministerial government; coalition management; bill amendment; 
Iceland.
Introduction 
Ministerial government has come under increasing scrutiny in Iceland after the economic 
collapse of  2008 and the nature of  ministerial accountability as well as the complexities 
of  coalition management have received greater attention than before. This may partly 
be the result of  increasingly difficult conditions for coalition governance as distrust of  
politicians and a more fragmented party system have to some extent undermined the 
foundations on which ministerial government rested. Our task is to delve into what the 
conditions for effective ministerial government might be and how they were influenced 
by the crash.
In an influential contribution to the literature on coalition governance, Laver and 
Shepsle (1994) argued that the main method for dealing with co-ordination problems in 
coalition governance was ministerial government. According to them, the initial agree-
ment on portfolio allocations within a coalition is the key to its subsequent actions and 
policies. The “effective policy of  any government”, Laver and Shepsle (1994, 8) main-
tain, “depends upon the allocation of  cabinet portfolios between politicians”. Coalition 
policies reflect the partisan composition of  the cabinet (rather than the influence of  the 
bureaucracy or legislature) and the allocation of  portfolios between parties (rather than 
the influence of  the prime minister or the cabinet collectively) but on the whole the 
allocation of  portfolios within the parties makes no difference. Thus “portfolio alloca-
tion does make a difference between, but not within, parties” (p. 10), at least so long as 
parties aren’t too heterogeneous. 
While ministerial government may be an efficient method of  bargaining by reducing 
transaction costs, there are problems concerning its ability to deal with principal agent 
problems arising between party ministers and broader cabinet interests. In reality, min-
isters are usually not dictators within their portfolios and coalitions do attempt to make 
compromises across different issue areas (Dunleavy & Bastow 2001). 
Laver and Shepsle’s insight that individual parties or ministers will have an incentive 
to renege on coalition-wide compromise has, nevertheless, guided much of  the subse-
quent work on coalition governance. The idea of  ‘keeping tabs on partners’, according 
to which the coalition facilitates oversight of  coalition parties by their partners (Thies 
2001) is, e.g. offered as a solution to the commitment problem and aims at protecting 
the coalition’s negotiated agreement. Martin and Vanberg (2011), similarly, refer to par-
liaments as ‘policing institutions’ that allow coalition partners to monitor and modify 
legislative proposals made by ministers. 
Several mechanisms have come under scrutiny as potential safeguards against minis-






comes into power and is generally considered binding on coalition partners (e.g., Müller 
& Strøm 2000; Moury 2013). Indridason and Kristinsson (2013) show that coalition 
agreements are employed by cabinets that are less likely to be cohesive and Bäck et al. 
(2016) show that they are in fact an effective mechanism of  coalition management in the 
case of  multi-member coalitions with common-pool resource problems. Cabinet controls 
of  ministerial autonomy constitute another set of  mechanisms which include the use of  
ministerial hierarchy – in particular Prime Ministerial power – and cabinet committees 
which may curb the independence of  ministers substantially (Indridason & Kristins-
son 2015; Bowler et al. 2016). Watchdog mechanisms where coalition partners get to check 
ministry policies through Junior Ministers or parliamentary committee chairs can also 
function as important mechanisms of  coordination in coalition governance (Thies 2001; 
Martin & Vanberg 2011; Carroll & Cox 2012).
On the strength of  the theoretical and empirical criticism directed at the model of  
ministerial government, we might expect such systems to be rare and unstable. Nonethe-
less, we maintain that two main conditions may facilitate such a governance mode. One 
is that small ideological differences between parties are likely to reduce agency cost in 
coalition governance by reducing the temptation of  ministers (or their parties) to shirk 
on the coalition deal. Laver and Shepsle’s model – at least according to the initial formu-
lation – makes no assumptions concerning the role of  ideology in coalition governance.1 
In that model, coalition governance is simply a log-rolling procedure, where influence is 
traded across issue areas rather than within them. If  ministerial government is to func-
tion effectively, however, it would seem an obvious advantage if  the policy preferences 
of  a minister’s party are similar to those of  his or her partners. This will reduce agency 
costs within the coalition. Even in cases where parties are influenced more by office 
seeking than policy concerns, e.g. on account of  a large emphasis on patronage and 
material rewards, small ideological distance is likely to minimize political frictions within 
the coalition and facilitate peaceful (in this case departmentalized) sharing of  the spoils. 
The second facilitating factor is a powerful parliament which can enforce the in-
complete contract implicit in the coalition bargain on an ad hoc basis. By this we do not 
mean the use of  watchdog chairs of  parliamentary committees, which are more properly 
seen as part of  the original coalition bargain than an attempt to bypass the need for such 
a deal, which ministerial government is all about. Instead, we assume that the coalition 
party groups in parliament develop coalition policy on an on-going basis, not necessarily 
in accordance with any pre-conceived plan. This means that parliamentary committees 
must be relatively free to amend government proposals at their discretion. The coalition 
deal is not simply enforced by the committees; it is partly made there. For such a mecha-
nism to function effectively, however, a solid parliamentary majority and a high degree 
of  party cohesion are required. Numerically weak majorities and fragmented parties risk 
being exposed to blackmail by small groups of  MPs; they may often be forced to make 
major changes to ministerial policy. Hence, ministerial government is likely to function 
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1. Ministerial government in Iceland
Ministerial government is deeply embedded in Icelandic jurisprudence and political 
practice. Ministers are chief  executives in their respective divisions of  the administrative 
system and they are neither obliged to take orders from the Prime Minister nor the Cabi-
net according to law. The legal situation in this case corresponds fairly well with political 
reality. Ministers control their ministries. The main features of  ministerial government in 
Iceland include short coalition agreements, weak hierarchy among ministers, little collec-
tive cabinet control of  ministers, and little use of  watchdog mechanisms.
Short coalition agreements. Coalition agreements, dealing exclusively with policy issues, 
are regularly issued by Icelandic coalitions. While coalition formation is often a drawn-
out process, the coalition agreements themselves are short and usually written by the 
party leaders, their deputy leaders, and, in recent years, their personal assistants. A sim-
ple method of  evaluating the extensiveness of  the coalition agreements is to count the 
number of  words they contain. While verbosity may vary from one political context to 
another, the number of  words has been shown to be a significant predictor of  behavior 
(Back et al. 2017). Table 1 indicates that compared to other parliamentary systems coali-
tion agreements in Iceland tend to be relatively short.
Table 1. Coalition agreements 1980-2007: Mean number of words












Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000), Indriði H. Indriðason (2005) and Stefnuyfirlýsing ríkisstjórnarinnar 2007.
Iceland is among the states where coalition agreements are shortest. The only countries 
where coalition agreements are shorter, according to table 1, are semi-presidential sys-
tems that may not be fully comparable to parliamentary regimes. The mean length of  
coalition agreements in the 11 states was 9702 words. The longest agreement in Iceland 
in this period was 4505 words, less than half  the average length. Coalition agreements in 






The post-crash period, however, has seen substantial lengthening of  coalition agree-
ments to 6496 words on average in the case of  majority coalitions.
Weak ministerial hierarchy. Ministerial positions may vary in importance. Above all, 
the Prime Minister may be highly influential in some cabinets, and in some cases other 
ministers such as the minister of  finance and the portfolios controlled by the leaders 
of  other coalition parties also have outsized influence. In the Icelandic case, however, 
the PM has very limited formal powers and even less informal ones. According to the 
letter of  the constitution, the PM appoints ministers, decides their tasks, and fires them 
as the case may be. In practice, each coalition party selects its own ministers and even 
the PM needs the approval of  his or her parliamentary group before deciding on the list 
of  appointees from his or her party. There are no known examples of  coalition partners 
interfering with each other’s choice of  ministers. And in the rare cases where there are 
calls for the resignation of  an individual minister, the PM typically delegates the issue 
entirely to the respective party leader or parliamentary group. 
International comparisons show that the Icelandic PM is less influential than most 
of  his or her colleagues. According to O’Malley’s (2007) expert survey, the Icelandic 
PM is the least influential in a group of  22 parliamentary democracies while according 
to Druckman and Warwick’s (2005) estimates, the Icelandic PM ranks the third lowest 
in a group of  11 states.3 While the limited coordinating ability stemming from a weak 
PM may in some cases be offset by strong cabinet committees or collective leadership, 
the use of  cabinet committees in Iceland dates only back to the 1990s and they have 
remained fairly few in numbers. It is also noteworthy that in Warwick and Druckman’s 
dataset the second most influential minister – in Iceland the minister of  finance – ties as 
the second least influential “second” minister. 
Little collective cabinet control. The division of  labor between ministers and the cabinet in 
Iceland is broadly based on ministerial autonomy in all administrative matters and votes 
are never cast in the cabinet. Thus, the Icelandic cabinet is very different from the Swed-
ish one, which can issue directives to the administration – which individual ministers 
cannot – and formally takes tens of  thousands of  decisions every year. Most parliamen-
tary systems define a set of  issues where collective cabinet approval is needed (e.g. Erik-
sen 2003; Andeweg & Bakema 1994). This may include directives, white papers, major 
policy declarations, public appointments, committee appointments etc. In the Icelandic 
case the ministers are obliged to inform the cabinet concerning “important government 
business” (as the Constitution puts it) but the cabinet has no power to intervene. Only 
with regard to government bills does the cabinet have veto power, but in effect this is 
limited by a number of  factors. Usually the agenda of  cabinet meetings – at least prior 
to the revision of  the Ministry Act in 2011 – was only made available the night before a 
cabinet meeting and relevant documents might not even be distributed until the morn-
ing of  the meeting. Although agenda items are usually postponed upon request, this 
seriously limits the ability of  cabinet ministers and their assistants to scrutinize the work 
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Little use of  watchdog mechanisms. One of  the main characteristics of  ministerial govern-
ment is the absence of  any type of  watchdog mechanisms except the occasional use of  
watchdog chairs in parliamentary committees. There exist no Junior Minister positions 
in Iceland. Although ministers have access to political assistance in a number of  ways, 
this is exclusively used at the minister’s own discretion. In most cases ministerial assis-
tants are used to assist with public relations and party networking (Kristinsson 2016). 
While the idea of  introducing Junior Minister has been aired on rare occasions, it is safe 
to say that the idea of  appointing a Junior Minister from another party is entirely foreign 
to Icelandic politicians. 
Committee chairs, prior to the crash, were generally thought of  as the Minister’s clos-
est collaborators in parliament. While they might in some cases exert a certain degree of  
influence on the Minister – since they were in control of  the committee agenda – the use 
of  watchdog chairs was not common. In 2003 – 2009, 79% of  committee chairs were 
the respective ministers’ co-partisans. 
Why the Icelandic political parties adopted ministerial government over other forms 
of  coalition management remains an important question, although we deal with it only 
tentatively in the present paper. Material benefits have traditionally been an important 
part of  the payoffs of  coalition membership in Iceland. During the inter-war period, the 
parties developed a strong patronage orientation, which aimed at satisfying important 
constituency and sectoral interests (Indriðason 2005; Kristinsson 1996). Being excluded 
from power thus meant being starved of  the material benefits that government office 
provided. Hence, there was a strong office-seeking element in the major parties, not only 
among the party elites but reaching down to the network of  party supporters on the 
ground, who stood to benefit from access to power. 
By making the division of  portfolios the focal point of  coalition governance the par-
ties introduced a relatively simple principle for dividing the spoils. Each party controlled 
its portfolios without much outside interference. Only where major interests were at 
stake did the parties establish more elaborate mechanisms for sharing, such as in the 
financial system and foreign trade, where inter-party committees or boards and party 
quotas in the divisions of  administrative positions were common. The main players in 
this system were the Independence Party, representing private enterprise and the middle 
class, and the Progressive Party, representing farmers, the co-operative movement, and 
sparsely populated regions. Until 2008, every coalition, since the modern party system 
was molded around 1930, contained one or both of  these parties. The occasional ap-
pearance of  other parties in government occurred when one or more of  the left wing 
parties managed to gain access. The left in Iceland, however, was much weaker and 
fragmented than in the Scandinavian states. 
Interviews with political leaders indicate that the IP and PP remain broadly satisfied 
with the ministerial form of  government, which was practiced without serious chal-
lenges until the economic meltdown in 2008. Greater skepticism existed on the left. 
After the crash, criticism of  the existing mode of  coalition governance grew, especially 






lack of  inter-ministerial co-ordination was partly to blame for ineffective response to the 
impending threat of  financial meltdown (SIC 2010). The new left-wing coalition which 
took over after the crash therefore was determined to introduce reforms not only of  
economic and social policies but also of  the way politics was practiced in government 
and parliament. 
Several aspects of  politics in the period following the crash indicate that an attempt 
was made to abandon the practice of  ministerial governance. In the first place, coali-
tion agreements became much more detailed than before. The coalition agreement of  
Sigurðardóttir’s majority coalition in 2009 was 6997 words or roughly 2.7 times the 
pre-2009 mean. While subsequent agreements have been shorter, they have been con-
siderably longer than in the previous period, i.e. between 4 and 5.5 thousand words. The 
Ministry Act was revised in 2011 to strengthen coordination mechanisms at the cabinet 
and ministry level, including a new section on cabinet committees and, at least in the 
left-wing government of  2009-2013, the joint leadership of  the two coalition parties 
was clearly more assertive vis-à-vis individual ministers than usually had been the case. 
The use of  watchdog chairs increased substantially in the governments formed after the 
economic crisis although it bears noting that the comparison is complicated by the fact 
that Alþingi’s committee system changed in 2011. Alþingi’s committees used to largely 
mirror the ministerial portfolio jurisdictions but that was no longer true after the 2011 
reform. Rather than hazarding a guess at which portfolio each committee matches best, 
we examine all government bills between the legislation sessions starting in 2003 and 
concluding in 2014 and ask whether the proposing minister and the chairman of  the 
committee to which the bill was assigned came from the same party.4 Table 2 shows a 
very sharp decline in government bills that go through a committee chaired by an MP 
from the same party as the minister that introduced the legislation in parliament.  
Table 2. Same party committee chairs 2003-2014: % of parliamentary bills
Government Coalition Same Party  Chairs Mean Policy5 Distance N
IP-PP 2003-07 73.00% 4.8 474
IP-SDA 2007-09 93.00% 9.4 196
SDA-LG 2009-13 33.00% 7.8 572
PP-IP 2013-14 31.00% 1.3 104
Total 55.00% 6.7 1346
In part the changes that took place reflected widespread discontent with party domi-
nated politics as well as ministerial government. This was especially apparent on the left, 
among the Left-Greens, but the popular discontent affected all parties to some extent. 
Thus, party cohesion fell not only in the governing parties but also in the opposition 
(Kristinsson 2011). A significant aspect of  the change which took place, and the attempt 
to move away from ministerial governance, was greater willingness to accept small coali-
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over in February 2009 was a minority government and even if  it obtained a majority 
in the ensuing elections its majority had become shaky already by 2010 and it formally 
became a minority government again in 2012. Ministerial government, we maintain, 
requires strong majorities and cohesive parties in order for them to be able to deliver 
support for policies that are not easy to digest for all the coalition partners. The left-wing 
government which came into power was united more on a negative basis – against the 
IP and PP, which were widely blamed for the crash – and was forced to rely on more 
formal co-ordination mechanisms than earlier coalitions. Even so, the strain was formi-
dable and after suffering a number of  major political losses, the coalition eventually lost 
its majority and finished as a minority.
Our predictions concerning the impact of  ideological distance in the period leading 
up to 2008 are therefore not expected to hold in the subsequent period. Eroding majori-
ties and weaker party cohesion should lead to greater changes in government bills after 
the crash. Since ministers are more bound by the collective cabinet than in the preceding 
period, we should expect ideological distance to play a smaller role than before.
Above we have offered some evidence that appears consistent with Iceland having 
transitioned from a form of  cabinet governance that can be characterized as a minis-
terial government to a form that places greater emphasis on coordination within the 
cabinet. We now turn to examining some additional implication of  our thesis that focus 
on the changes in legislative politics that should accompany a decline in ministerial gov-
ernment. As the conditions that supported ministerial government gave way in the wake 
of  the financial crisis, eroding majorities and less party cohesion generate conditions in 
which Alþingi amends government legislation to a greater extent than it did previously. 
That is, the less the government can rely on its party members to rubberstamp its legis-
lation, the greater are the compromises it has to make. More importantly, the effect of  
ideological differences can be expected to change. Under ministerial government, there 
is little coordination within the cabinet and ministers are fairly autonomous when it 
comes to producing government bills. In such circumstances, Alþingi plays an important 
oversight role that serves to protect the (formal or informal) coalition agreement and 
maintain the coalition. Thus, when ideological differences within the coalition are large, 
the differences between the minister’s bill and the preferred outcome of  his or her coali-
tion partner are larger. Subsequently, the more extensively the minister’s bill is expected 
to be amended, the greater the ideological differences. In contrast, in the post-crisis 
period when there is less ministerial autonomy and greater coordination at the level of  
the cabinet, the extent to which government legislation is amended in the legislature is 
not expected to depend on ideological differences – that is, greater coordination within 
the cabinet at an earlier stage implies that the differences in the parties’ preferences 
have already been addressed. In the next section we examine this hypothesis as well as 
additional factors believed to affect amendment rates using data on all government bills 







2.1 Data and methods
Our key independent variable is the degree to which government bills are amended. The 
amount of  change is measured, as suggested by Pedrazzani and Zucchini (2013) as the 
number of  words changed from the initial version of  the bill presented to parliament 
to final legislation approved by parliament. Changes in the content of  a bill from its 
introduction to adoption are measured by counting the number of  words in the bill (k), 
the number of  words in the adopted legislation (l), the number of  deleted words in a bill 
(m) and the number of  new words in the adopted legislation (n). The amount of  change 
is calculated according to the formula . The theoretical range of  the change coefficient, x, is 
from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates identical documents and 100 means that the document 
is unrecognizable.
In the period under study, 2003-2014, a total of  1457 government bills, excluding 
budgetary bills, were introduced in the Alþingi.6 Their fate is reported in table 3. Budget 
related bills are not available in a format suitable for the present analysis but all 36 of  
them were, however, approved.
Table 3. Fate of government bills 2003-2014
Fate Number of Bills %
Not Approved 353 24.8
Approved w/Amendments 918 64.6
Approved w/o Amendments 150 10.6
Total: 1457 100.0
About a quarter of  all government bills fail to be adopted. In a comparative perspective, 
the proportion of  government bills passed (i.e., 75.2% of  introduced government bills) 
is not unusual. According to Bräuninger amd Debus (2009, 820), the corresponding fig-
ures for Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are in the 68-95% range. 
Legislative activism of  the Icelandic Alþingi is better reflected in the amount of  changes 
made to government bills than in the number of  government bills blocked. Table 4 sum-
marizes the total number of  words in the legislative text and commentary in government 
bills according to the fate of  the legislative proposal. Bills that pass without amendments 
(10.6% of  government bills) are primarily short bills of  secondary importance — they 
average just over one thousand words. In contrast, bills that fail are on average close to 
ten thousand words and bills passing with amendments are close to six thousand words. 
Other evidence supports the interpretation that these bills are of  secondary importance, 
including the number of  speeches made in plenum during discussions and the number 
of  comments received by the parliamentary committees, both of  which are much lower 
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Table 4. Total length of bills and explanatory notes
Fate of Bill Mean N Standard Deviation
Not Approved 9937 350 14608
Approved w/Amendments 5781 918 9937
Approved w/o Amendments 1160 150 2115
Total 6318 1418 11098
Considering that the great majority of  approved legislation is adopted after the initial 
bill is amended it is clear that amendments are an important form of  parliamentary 
activism in Alþingi. Figure 1 shows the average change coefficient for each session in 
our data set (additional summary statistics are provided in the appendix). The average 
change coefficient for adopted legislation is about 20%. The average prior to the crash 
in 2008 is slightly lower (15%) but still substantially higher than might be expected in a 
parliamentary system. After the crash the amount of  amendments to government bills 
is higher (26%) although the exceptionally high numbers for 2011-2012 account for a 
considerable part of  the change. Higher rates of  amendment can partly be accounted 
for by weak support for the government in parliament in 2010-2013. The return of  a 
strong parliamentary majority in 2013, however, seems not to have facilitated a return to 
pre-crisis figures. An average change of  21% in the session of  2013-2014 is still consid-
erably higher than anything seen prior to the crash.
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Figure 1. Degree of Bill Amendment 
Turning to our independent variable, the key question of interest is how intra-coalitional 
ideological differences shape legislation. We conducted an expert survey in which 26 
experts (academics, journalists, and specialists in Alþingi) were asked about the ideological 
positions of key political actors in the issue area corresponding to each of the ministerial 
portfolios. Thus, within each portfolio, we have estimates of the ideological positions of 
each political party as well as the cabinet ministers occupying the portfolio. We consider 
two measures. The first measure, Ideological Distance: Coalition Parties, is simply the ideological 
distance between the coalition partners (all the coalitions were two-party coalitions). The 
second measure, Ideological Distance: Minister-Own Party, considers the difference in the issue 
positions of the minister and his own party — if the legislative committees have a role in 
providing ministers with oversight then more extensive amendments are expected when 
the minister is a poor representative of her party on the issue. 
Committee chairs that share party affiliation with the minister in charge of the 
corresponding portfolio are expected to usher bills through the committee and to shield 
them from extensive revisions. In contrast, if the committee is chaired by a member of the 
coalition partner, the bill is less likely to become a law but if it does it is subjected to greater 
amendments. The variable Same Party Committee Chair is coded one when the portfolio 
minister and the committee chair are members of the same party. 
Government MPs is the total number of government party MPs. An indicator variable 
for Minority Governments is also included to account for the possibility that minority 
governments face different challenges in passing legislation. While minority governments 
are rare in Iceland, there are two minority governments in the period under study. First, a 
caretaker cabinet of the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement was in 
Figure 1. Degree of Bill Amendment: Change coefficient
Turning to our independent variable, the key question of  interest is how intra-coalitional 
ideological differences shape legislation. We conducted an expert survey in which 26 ex-
perts (academics, journalists, and specialists in Alþingi) were asked about the ideological 
positions of  key political actors in the issue area corresponding to each of  the ministerial 
portfolios. Thus, within each portfolio, we have estimates of  the ideological pos tions of  
each political party as well as the cabinet ministers occupying the portfolio. We consider 
two measures. The first measure, Ideological Distance: Coalition Parties, is simply the ideolog-






The second measure, Ideological Distance: Minister-Own Party, considers the difference in 
the issue positions of  the minister and his own party — if  the legislative committees 
have a role in providing ministers with oversight then more extensive amendments are 
expected when the minister is a poor representative of  her party on the issue.
Committee chairs that share party affiliation with the minister in charge of  the cor-
responding portfolio are expected to usher bills through the committee and to shield 
them from extensive revisions. In contrast, if  the committee is chaired by a member of  
the coalition partner, the bill is less likely to become a law but if  it does it is subjected 
to greater amendments. The variable Same Party Committee Chair is coded one when the 
portfolio minister and the committee chair are members of  the same party.
Government MPs is the total number of  government party MPs. An indicator variable 
for Minority Governments is also included to account for the possibility that minority gov-
ernments face different challenges in passing legislation. While minority governments 
are rare in Iceland, there are two minority governments in the period under study. First, 
a caretaker cabinet of  the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement 
was in office for few months ahead of  the 2009 election. Second, after continuing in 
office as a majority government following the 2009 election, the SDA-LGM coalition 
lost its parliamentary majority in 2011 and governed as a minority coalition until 2013. 
Pedrazzani and Zucchini (2013, 687) suggest that more changes are made to minority 
government bills than others.
Stakeholder attention was measured through the Number of  Comments on the legisla-
tive proposal submitted to Alþingi by various actors. We consider both the total number 
of  comments received as well as the number of  comments offered by specific groups 
of  actors. In different parts of  the analysis we report the results for the number of  com-
ments offered by interest groups and private sector actors.7
We include several control variables in our analysis. Legislation varies in complexity, 
which may affect the extent of  amendment. Alþingi is ill-equipped with dealing with 
complex legislation — at least relative to the expertise that exists in the bureaucracy. 
While MPs may not lack the will to intervene in government legislation, they often lack 
expertise or access to information to effectively scrutinize the legislation. The lack of  
expertise may reduce how much a complex government bill is amended but it is also 
possible that Alþingi, in the face of  complex issues, will opt not to act on the legisla-
tive proposal.8 When complex bills are passed, they are, however, amended less than 
relatively simple legislative proposals. The first measure of  bill complexity is simply its 
length, Bill Length, measured in thousands of  words. An explanatory note or a memo-
randum generally accompanies legislative proposals in Alþingi. Unlike the explanatory 
notes in, e.g., UK’s House of  Commons, that offer a simple explanation of  the purpose 
and effect of  the legislation — explanatory notes in Alþingi can contain an extensive 
discussion of  the legislation context, providing both the rationale for its introduction 
and justification of  its contents. The length of  the explanatory note serves as another 
measure of  the complexity of  the legislation.
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duced in the following session if  not adopted into law. With each legislative session last-
ing about eight or nine months, the cabinet and legislature face significant time pressures 
and legislation introduced late in the term is, other things equal, less likely to be adopted. 
Ministers may, however, face a dilemma when it comes to the timing of  bill introduction. 
While a bill that is introduced early in a legislative session is more likely to be adopted, 
introducing bills early will also allow the committees ample time to amend it. To ac-
count for the effects of  timing of  introduction, the variable Days Remaining measures the 
number of  months until the time that Alþingi normally concludes its business for the 
session, i.e., in June each year except in election years when the session ends at the end 
of  April.9 An indicator variable for Election Year is also included to account for the fact 
that a shorter session may alter the dynamics of  the legislative process — as, indeed, may 
the fact that elections are looming on the horizon.
Time can also work in favor of  the opposition. The parliamentary majority is not 
checked by many veto points. While the president may refuse to countersign legislation, 
which triggers a referendum on the legislation, this has only been used three times since 
the establishment of  the republic in 1944 and is, in any case, not a mechanism controlled 
by the opposition. The main tool of  the opposition to influence legislation — in the face 
of  a united government majority — is the filibuster.
Technically the government can end filibusters, but a tacit agreement exists among 
the parties not to use such measures. Bills that are not adopted in a given parliamentary 
session have to be introduced anew in the following session if  they are not abandoned. 
Towards the end of  the parliamentary session the government sometimes gets into a time 
crunch with its legislative program and has to negotiate with the opposition on the order 
of  priorities. This provides an opportunity for the opposition to influence which bills are 
passed and potentially their content as well. The opposition is likely to use such pressure 
to thwart bills that address salient issues while the government is likely to prioritize those 
bills. Salient bills attracting a lot of  attention during parliamentary debates are likely to 
be seen as a test of  the government’s governing capacity and are hence more likely to 
be prioritized by the government and more likely to be passed. Barring a filibuster, the 
government is typically in a position to pass its legislation as party discipline is high in 
the Icelandic parties and comparable to the Scandinavian countries (Kristinsson 2011).
Legislation that is considered highly salient in government-opposition terms is ex-
pected to be more likely to be adopted but not necessarily amended less. Measuring the 
salience of  a particular legislative proposal is challenging but we consider speeches made 
in plenum as a proxy. First, we consider the Number of  Speakers that offered their views 
on the legislation by speaking to the chamber. Second, allowing for the possibility that 
some MPs speak multiple times, we count the Number of  Speeches made in the chamber.
We use OLS regression models to estimate the effect of  the covariates on the extent 
to which a bill is amended.10 As our expectation is that Icelandic cabinets functioned as 
ministerial cabinets until 2008 but took a more collegial from after the economic crisis, 
we present two sets of  models; one focusing on the parliaments prior to 2008 and one 







The results of  the analysis of  how extensively government legislation is amended are 
presented in table 5 and are largely in line with expectations. Prior to the crash, greater 
ideological distance between the coalition parties on a given policy issue was associated 
with more amendment as expected if  the coalition parties use the legislature to enforce 
the coalition agreement, i.e., a minister’s bill is more likely to deviate from the coalition 
compromise the further apart the parties are ideologically. A standard deviation change 
in the value of  issue distance corresponds to a three percentage points more amend-
ments — moving from the minimum to maximum policy difference amounts to an 
eleven percentage points change. We also find that an increase in the policy distance be-
tween a minister and his own party is associated with less extensive amendments, which 
is a somewhat unexpected finding. A priori, if  the coalition uses Alþingi to enforce the 
coalition agreement one would expect more legislative amendments when the minister is 
ideologically distant from her own party. There are two possible reasons, related to selec-
tion effects, for why this might not be the case. First, parties may be unlikely to appoint 
ideological outliers to portfolios they consider highly salient. Thus, ideological outliers 
may be most likely to be found in portfolios that the party cares less about and, thus, 
involves legislation the party may not be too bothered about amending. Second, minis-
ters that are ideologically distant from their own parties may be closer to the ideological 
preferences of  their coalition partners. They may be more likely to propose legislation 
that is closer to the coalition compromise and, thus, it is less likely to require extensive 
amending. After 2008, these patterns disappear, and ideological differences do not have 
statistically significant effect on amendment activity.12
The party identity of  the committee chair was hypothesized to influence the extent 
to which bills are amended. In particular, bills are expected to be amended more when 
the committee chair and the minister in the relevant portfolio are not members of  the 
same party. The results prior to the crisis suggest that this might be the case; the coef-
ficient for watchdog or shadow chairs is positive but is not statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. After the crisis, the effect of  shadow chairs flips around (but, again, 
is not statistically significant).
Our measures of  stakeholder interest focused on the number of  submitted com-
ments on a particular piece of  legislation by external actors. More contentious and sali-
ent pieces of  legislation are more likely to receive comments and, as expected, bills that 
receive more comments are amended more extensively. Taking a closer look at where 
the comments come from it becomes apparent that before the crisis comments from 
the private sector were most strongly associated with changes in the bill.13 Comments 
from private sector actors, however, have a smaller and statistically insignificant effect 
after the crisis while comments from interest groups have a bigger, and now statistically 
significant, effect after the crisis.
Most of  our control variables did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
amendment rate.  The exceptions to that were the two variables that had to do with tim-
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bills introduced early in the session were amended more extensively which was also true 
of  bills introduced in sessions leading up to an election year.
Table 5. Bill amendment
Pre-Collapse Post-Collapse
(1) (2) (3) (4)

















































































Observations 549 549 341 341
R2 0.027 0.062 0.080 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3. Conclusion
Despite widespread scepticism about ministerial government it appears it can function 
effectively under certain conditions. Prior to the economic crash of  2008, Iceland had 
a strong element of  ministerial government, including short coalition agreements, weak 






nisms. Each party was left relatively free to control its issue area although with some 
exceptions. In the case of  legislation, the Alþingi played an unusually active role in pro-
cessing government bills where minimum winning coalitions of  two or three parties 
simplified the process of  negotiation. Strong party cohesion also contributed to coali-
tion management by strengthening the credibility of  party commitment. Our analysis 
indicates that small ideological distance between ministers and their coalition partners 
contributed to the safer passage of  bills and smaller amendments in parliament. Part of  
making this system work involved allowing lobbyists of  various kinds relatively unfet-
tered access to Alþingi so that interests associated with the different coalition partners 
could have a say in how government bills developed. 
After the crash several features of  coalition governance changed considerably. Al-
though Alþingi remains an important arena for lobbyism, the development of  more 
collective cabinet mechanisms has weakened ministerial control to some extent. More 
extensive coalition agreements, greater attention to hierarchy in government and greater 
use of  watchdog chairs seem to have undermined ministerial autonomy to some extent.
However, several features of  the old system remain in force, including the centrality 
of  the Alþingi as an arena for stakeholder interests and the legal framework is still to 
a large extent geared towards ministerial government. In fact, the issue of  ministerial 
autonomy and collective control has to a certain extent become a contested issue. While 
the IP and PP seem to remain happy with ministerial government, some of  the other 
political forces are more sceptical. Thus, strong interpretations of  ministerial autonomy 
may have played a role in the downfall of  the three-way coalition of  the IP and two of  
the new political forces in 2017. One of  them, Bright Future, refused to take responsibil-
ity for the actions of  IP ministers and left the coalition – an unprecedented occurrence 
in Icelandic politics.
Notes
1 In Laver and Shepsle’s model, ideology influences which coalition forms but it is assumed not to 
have other implications for coalition governance, e.g., that larger ideological differences may make 
the coalition more difficult to maintain.
2 Ministerial government is more commonly associated with weak parliaments that lack the ability 
to curtail the powers of  the cabinet.  Our claim here is that ministerial government is also possible 
in the presence of  a strong parliament, provided that the cabinet parties are able to maintain disci-
plined parties.
3 According to Strøm et al. (2003, 183-189) measure of  the prime minister’s institutional power, Ice-
land scores 3 (on a seven-point scale), with ten of  the seventeen countries scoring higher on their 
scale.
4 A potential limitation of  this comparison is that the ministers may present different numbers of  
government bills. However, one may also argue that the focus on government bills is of  greater 
substantive interest, i.e., ‘shadow chairs’ are only important to the extent that they actually deal with 
legislation originating from a minister of  a different party.
5 On the measurement of  policy distance, see below.
6 The analysis is confined to government bills.
7 The comments were coded based on whether they were submitted by parliamentary committees, 
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groups, research institutions, the private sector, organizations and clubs, and individuals. Comments 
by other actors, e.g., government departments, government agencies, and public organizations, were 
also considered but did not appear to have a systematic effect on the degree of  amendment.
8 One potential issue here is that bills expire at the end of  each session. Thus, Alþingi may allow bills 
to “fail” in order for them to be reintroduced in the following session to continue work on the bill.
9 Alþingi’s sessions run from October 1 each year until the end of  the September the following year. 
Normally the last meetings of  Alþingi occur around mid-June although in a few instances Alþingi 
reconvenes in the same session in late fall. In addition, there are short summer sessions in election 
years following the election but typically Alþingi does not conduct much business during the sum-
mer sessions. We exclude bills proposed during reconvened and summer sessions of  Alþingi.
10 As the two aspects of  legislative success are unlikely to be independent, a Heckman selection model 
can be used to model the adoption and amendment of  government bills. Apart from the obvious 
theoretical connection, using a selection model is also important as changes to government legisla-
tion are only observed for bills that are eventually adopted by Alþingi. As it turns out, the estimated 
effects of  our independent variable on how extensively bills are amended are hardly affected at all 
by whether we apply a Heckman model or a regular OLS regression.
11 A disadvantage of  splitting the sample into pre- and post-crash periods is that it one cannot apply 
tests of  statistical significance to compare the change in the coefficients. As will become clear, there 
is a quite sharp change in the patterns observed but to verify that the change in the coefficient was 
statistically significant we also ran models that interacted the key independent variables with a pre-/
post-crash dummy (which confirmed that the differences are statistically significant).
12 The sample of  bills after the crisis is slightly smaller but it is unlikely that the lack of  an effect here 
can be attributed to small sample size.
13 Comments made by other external actors did not have a statistically significant effect at the conven-
tional level of  statistical significance.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Summary statistics for change coefficient by legislative session 
Legislative Session Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
130 105 17.67 25.39 0 96.16
131 89 13.25 18.88 0 86.00
132 112 14.69 20.48 0 85.39
133 100 17.60 25.56 0 94.41
134 7 14.33 13.46 0 33.43
135 111 15.33 22.55 0 98.66
136 76 19.17 26.09 0 98.71
137 24 26.62 30.06 0 96.73
138 113 16.19 20.98 0 96.85
139 105 23.20 27.57 0 96.79
140 71 22.54 23.28 0 94.06
141 72 19.37 23.35 0 90.84
142 10 31.63 35.69 0 87.44
143 71 19.68 23.44 0 92.80
